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Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity 
would be well-advised to read the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, 
edited by Dan Zahavi. With a small caveat to follow, the book certainly realises Zahavi’s 
expressed aim of providing a “representative sample of what is currently happening in 
phenomenology, and make it clear to philosophers from other traditions that 
phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is quite alive and in a position to 
make valuable contributions to contemporary thought” (4).  
 
 Of course, it is always possible to quibble regarding the “representative sample” 
claim for any such volume, and I think it is fair to say that this book actually has 
particular strengths that simultaneously preclude it being a wholly representative sample 
of the best of the field. One reason for this is that it is deliberately not a historically 
focused book, eschewing scholarly chapters on famous phenomenological names, as well 
as prolonged or detailed exposition for its own sake (3). Moreover, many of the essays 
also have what might be described as a problem-centred approach. This has its own 
benefits for those of us working within the field, and it also makes possible some quite 
detailed and compelling engagements with analytic philosophy.  
 
 Indeed, to qualify slightly my opening sentence of this review, I think that any 
analytic philosopher prone to dismissing phenomenology as dead and buried – for 
example as a research program with no agreed method and no agreed results, as Daniel 
Dennett once declared – is especially well advised to read this book, since the majority of 
essays in this collection make a sustained and convincing effort to put the lie to such 
characterisations, and to show the enduring relevance of phenomenology to 
contemporary analytic philosophy. Issues explored in detail include methodological 
matters pertaining to the relationship between transcendental philosophy and naturalism, 
as well as debates concerning direct realism in perception, conceptual and non-conceptual 
content, to name but a few.  
 
 As such, it might be maintained that this Oxford Handbook of Contemporary 
Phenomenology performatively shows that it is not phenomenology but the distinction 
between analytic and continental that is a quaint historical curiosity, and indeed one that 
that we should all be happy has passed into history. However, I do not think it is entirely 
a coincidence that this book, broad and pluralist as it is in one sense, nonetheless 
reinstitutes a slightly differently configured ‘divide’ in another, since it is much less 
aimed at convincing other parts of contemporary continental philosophy – e.g. 
psychoanalysts, deconstructivists, Deleuzians, Badiouians, Speculative Realists, etc. – 
that phenomenology is alive and kicking.  
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 While Zahavi in his introduction briefly raises the recent reinventions and critical 
engagements with phenomenology by philosophers such as Derrida, Marion, Henry, 
Levinas, and others, these philosophers and the ideas stemming from them are not 
discussed much in this volume (admittedly, Henry, Ricoeur, and others are treated more 
at length in the final sections of the book on “Sociality, Time and History”). Of course, 
no book can do everything, and despite some of my above cautionary remarks, I think 
that Zahavi is right to maintain that some of the most important contemporary 
phenomenological philosophers are included here.  
 
 It would be exceedingly boring for me to offer short summaries of the 28 chapters 
in this Handbook, but in what follows I will endeavour to give some indication of the 
book’s structure and contents through considering many of the seven parts into which it 
sub-divides. This is a partial sample of the book, reflective of my own interests. 
 
 Subjectivity and Nature. One of the central themes of Part 1 of the book is the 
fate of transcendental philosophy and phenomenology’s relation to naturalism. Most 
readers of this review will not need me to tell them that two of the foremost writers on 
this issue, including collaboratively, have been Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi himself. 
Their collaborative writings (e.g., The Phenomenological Mind and the authors’ 
subsequent responses to the reviews it has received) have often evinced what appear to be 
quite significant differences in their conceptions of phenomenology and the prospects for 
any naturalising of it.  
 
 Zahavi’s introduction in this Handbook frames the transcendental dimension that 
he thinks is essential to phenomenology, a dimension without which, he suggests, one 
risks giving the game away to empirical science or other forms of philosophy. However, 
Gallagher’s essay in this volume, “On the Possibility of Naturalizing Phenomenology”, is 
significantly less committal on the question of transcendental phenomenology. Gallagher 
denies that either transcendental phenomenology or empirical investigation might be said 
to be more basic (73). He instead deploys a double strategy: Gallagher seeks to 
characterize canonical phenomenologists of the likes of Merleau-Ponty as having been 
engaged in philosophical projects that were not, strictly speaking, pure transcendental 
phenomenology, and he also outlines how phenomenology today can interact with 
contemporary empirical science without being reduced to it. Gallagher hence advocates 
something more like a phenomenological psychology, which he again takes Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy to support implicitly, while also offering a meta-philosophical 
justification for a view that might be called dialectical phenomenology, which argues for 
phenomenology to exist in a relationship of something akin to mutual constraint with the 
relevant empirical sciences.   
 
 Merleau-Ponty has become an interesting philosopher in these debates. Some 
proclaim him a cognitive scientist and naturalist philosopher before his time (albeit a 
non-reductive one); others argue that he is a traditional transcendental philosopher (albeit 
with the turn to the lived body rather than consciousness) who is pretty much anti-science 
and anti-naturalism, as Tom Baldwin argues in a recent article in the journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy (2013). Both sides of the debate can produce textual evidence to 
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back up their views, perhaps especially from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception. One problem for Gallagher’s reception of Merleau-Ponty’s work, however, is 
that notwithstanding Merleau-Ponty’s continued engagement with science in his Nature 
lectures, and in The Visible and the Invisible, it would be difficult to say that his “indirect 
ontology”, the work of the mature Merleau-Ponty, goes in the sort of direction one might 
expect for a proto-cognitive scientist. Interestingly, this important book is scarcely cited 
in this Handbook at all. 
 
 Steven Crowell by and large seems to endorse Zahavi’s conception of 
transcendental phenomenology in his contribution to this volume, “Transcendental 
Phenomenology and the Seductions of Naturalism: Subjectivity, Consciousness and 
Meaning”. Certainly for Crowell, phenomenology involves pure transcendental 
considerations and has an autonomy in relation to empirical and other theoretical matters, 
even if Crowell recognises that some of the later phenomenologists contest the extent to 
which consciousness can be the focus (26). Of course, in one sense any turn to the body 
(even if lived body) makes a pure conception of transcendental phenomenology more 
difficult to sustain, and that is why in much of his work Husserl resisted such a move. 
Crowell, however, criticises Husserl for refusing to grant the embodied person 
transcendental status, suggesting that Husserl’s reasons for resisting this step betrayed his 
own naturalistic assumptions (26). On this account, then, the founder of phenomenology 
as a rigorous science could not (always) quite practice what he preached. As far as this 
goes, I agree with Crowell’s analyses.  
 
 Crowell, however, thinks we might still issue a corrective and attain to a 
methodologically pure form of transcendental phenomenology. As Crowell puts it, “The 
epoché expresses transcendental phenomenology’s commitment to the analytic autonomy 
of first-person experience”, which “precludes me from appealing in my analysis to any 
third-person explanatory theories of the experience in question (for instance, causal-
genetic ones) since any such theory necessarily posits the existence of both explanans and 
explanandum” (28).  On my view, the transcendental and descriptive dimensions of a 
phenomenological inquiry should indeed aim not to appeal to third-person explanatory 
categories, although I am rather more sanguine than Crowell about whether this 
presuppositionless bracketing can be achieved. Moreover, when it comes to justifying 
phenomenology in relation to other ways of doing philosophy and others forms of 
explanation, I think that at this meta-level, inferential thinking is again not simply 
inevitable but also desirable. 
 
 At other times, however, Crowell seems to invoke what I have called a more 
dialectical understanding of phenomenology in the above discussion of Gallagher’s work. 
In an intriguing section entitled “Towards a Transcendental Naturalism” Crowell says, 
“the ‘nature’ that belongs to the phenomenologically pre-given world is relative to culture 
in just the way that ‘nature’ as the object of natural science is relative to theory” (43). 
Here there seems to be an admission of encroachment, something like what Derrida 
might call “a principle of contamination”. If ‘phenomenological nature’, for want of a 
better word, is relative to culture, as Crowell concedes, can the theoretical really be 
bracketed away, tout court? Does the theoretical not permeate the cultural? If so, perhaps 
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we need to be vigilant about this, to embrace a more pluralist conception of 
phenomenology that does not have an autonomous or secure domain. It may indeed be 
true that the lived body, the person, being-in-the-world (these seem to be synonyms for 
Crowell) do not show up if we are labouring under a certain externalist conception of 
‘nature’ (44), and that they depend upon an attitudinal shift to access them, but that does 
not show that such analyses are ipso facto autonomous. Crowell demands that we strictly 
separate phenomenological from causal accounts, methodologically speaking, but if our 
transcendental conditions are temporally and historically based as Heidegger would 
concede (or relative to culture in Crowell’s terms), can science really be kept in principle 
apart, or do certain possibilities and ways of thinking become part of our life-world in 
such a way that the epoché is a useful tool, even an indispensable tool for certain 
philosophical purposes, rather than a presuppositionless and autonomous attitude?  
 
 Intentionality, Perception, and Embodiment. The first two essays of Part Two 
dovetail nicely, with John Drummond’s “Intentionality without Representationalism” and 
David Woodruff Smith’s “Perception, Context, and Direct Realism” both defending in 
their different ways phenomenological-inspired accounts of direct perception and arguing 
against representationalist and inferentialist accounts of our access to perceptual objects 
(as does Overgaard later in the volume in relation to our perception of other people). 
While some related views have enjoyed a revival in analytic philosophy in recent times, it 
is certainly still not in the mainstream, and these phenomenologically-inspired works 
promise to help revivify that debate.  
 
 In that respect, however, a lot hinges on modal factors like the use of necessity in 
phenomenological and non-phenomenological debates. Phenomenologists like 
Drummond, for example, tend to find the modal argument for indirect perception 
uncompelling – e.g., that it is logically possible to have exactly the same experience with 
a veridical object present and when it is not present in a hallucination. They are likely to 
join Merleau-Ponty and say that such does not appear to be experientially the case; 
reports from patients, at least, seem to suggest that the veridical and the hallucinatory are 
not entirely indistinguishable for them, even if there is uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Pressed on whether it is logically possible that one may have exactly the same experience 
with a given veridical object as cause and also without any such object as cause, they are 
likely to defer to Husserl and suggest that this conception of logical possibility is merely 
an abstract and idle formal possibility, rather than an eidetic possibility about which we 
might have a concrete intuition. 
 
 Komarine Romdenh-Romluc’s essay, “Thought in Action”, focuses on Hubert 
Dreyfus’s appropriations of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, building on but also 
criticising Dreyfus’s emphasis on smooth coping. On her view, Dreyfus gives thought 
next to no role in expert and skilled behavior. This is alleged to be wrong on its own 
terms (empirically and phenomenologically), and wrong if it is meant to be a reading of 
Merleau-Ponty. In regard to all of her discussion complicating this picture of “mindless 
coping”, I think she is right, although I worry that Dreyfus’s position is presented in a 
rather simplified and deterministic form here. On Romdenh-Romluc’s presentation of 
Dreyfus, it is hard to think why one would ever do philosophy at all. But, of course, part 
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of Dreyfus’s point is that things are inevitably “unready-to-hand”, “conspicuous”, to 
employ some Heideggerian parlance, so smooth coping is never unproblematically 
attained in terms of bodily intentionality. There is a level of bodily intentionality that 
seeks such an equilibrium but it is, as Merleau-Ponty says, always imminent and never 
realised. That is the case without even getting to the personal dreams and hopes for the 
future that each of us may have, nor indeed the omnipresence of our past, whether in 
biographical memories, sedimented habits, etc. In general, though, it is impossible to 
quarrel with her contention that even skilled sportsman do need to use thought to guide 
their action. However amateurish and unsophisticated they may appear when 
subsequently interrogated about their deployment of those skills, there is a “reckoning 
with the possible” that sometimes involves extricating oneself from absorbed coping and 
which is pretty much indispensable to success and expertise in all such fields, especially 
given a variable playing field and conditions, as well as variable opponents. 
 
 In “Sex, Gender and Embodiment” Sara Heinämaa offers a detailed account of the 
uses of phenomenology in regard to the lived body and the way in which it can mobilise a 
critique of the pervasive sex-gender distinction as basically stemming from an uncritical 
reliance upon the natural attitude. For her, “the body itself is fundamentally a pre-
scientific object that is co-given to us in action and communication and is not something 
that we make, fabricate, or invent” (217). I think her analyses are insightful in this 
respect, but again the strict separation between the body as lived and the body as object 
(e.g., the body as known by science, interpellated by culture, etc.), is perhaps a little more 
permeable than her analyses suggest.  
 
 Ethics, Politics and Sociability. I was fortunate enough to be part of a packed 
SPEP crowd when the double-billing of Zahavi and Bernard Waldenfels presented the 
talks that have subsequently appeared in this volume. Zahavi’s paper, in particular, is a 
model of clarity and acumen, convincingly showing why phenomenological accounts of 
shame have certain advantages over other contemporary treatments. Waldenfels’s 
chapter, “Responsive Ethics”, is likewise impressive, but for me the highlight of this 
section is Søren Overgaard’s chapter “Other People”, which nicely teases apart the 
epistemic and descriptive problems of other minds. Overgaard cautions 
phenomenologists against over-extending themselves in regard to their rejections of 
inferentialist accounts of social cognition (468); he nonetheless makes some important 
points regarding why we should call something perceptual rather than inferential. For 
Overgaard, what we call inferences are standardly able to be revised and/or blocked, and 
this should also be true (albeit more difficult) for those inferences that are said to have 
become subconscious or habituated over a period of time (467). This can be done through 
training and the acquisition of new habits, and sometimes even through reasoning and 
having something brought to one’s conscious attention. To pick a deliberately contentious 
example: perhaps the policeman who sees an indigenous Australian or an African-
American and makes the snap judgment that that person is dangerous, then draws a 
weapon and fires, is using subconscious and habituated inferences rather than mere 
perception. Even though it occurs instantaneously and without any explicit racist thoughts 
intruding into a person’s consciousness, we might maintain that what are being processed 
here are fast-tracked inferences, and those inferences may be based on previous 
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experiences and associations (with social and historical causes, like poverty and 
marginalisation, as well, possibly, as latent racism). But these sorts of inferences, 
Overgaard plausibly maintains, are revisable under pressure, and with training, etc., in a 
way that perceptions of some core emotional expressions, in particular, do not seem to 
be. Someone simply looks angry tout court, even if we judge later or after the event that 
this was feigned. We might compare this to the perception of the well-known Müller-
Lyer illusion. Our judgment that the lines in such an illusion are equal when we check 
with a ruler, or are told this by a teacher or psychologist, does not change the way they 
look to us. Overgaard’s claim (borrowing the terms from Zenon Pylyshyn) is that if there 
is cognitive impenetrability of this sort in the perception of core emotional expressions 
like anger, as there seems to be, then we should be inclined to call it perception rather 
than inference (467). 
 
 Klaus Held makes some interesting remarks concerning the relationship between 
phenomenology and the political world in his paper, “Towards a Phenomenology of the 
Political World”. He situates phenomenology within a Greek tradition of opposing 
episteme to doxa. As Socrates infamously discovered, any epistemological critique aimed 
at those within doxa (or within the natural attitude) is liable to being received as 
otherworldly and potentially dangerous. As Klaus frames this relationship: “the right by 
which philosophy could claim a superiority to doxa would have to remain inconceivable 
for them. This means that episteme’s frontal assault on doxa, carried out by Heraclitus, 
can never lead the many toward opening themselves for the one world. Episteme’s 
unmediated confrontation with the natural attitude makes an unsolvable riddle out of how 
the human beings that live within this attitude would ever bring themselves to turn away 
from it” (450–451). Klaus hence touches on the gap that separates philosophy and 
politics, and something of this order appears to be what Deleuze and Guattari were 
getting at when they suggested that “the question of desire’s involvement in its own 
involuntary servitude is the fundamental problem of political philosophy”. Reflections on 
rational self-interest, for example, and even rational argument per se, will not suffice for 
the overcoming of illusions and for social and political transformation. 
 
 One response is to reinstitute a stark contrast between episteme and doxa, as 
Badiou has arguably done. Held’s conclusion is rather less radical. He says we must 
presume/posit some middle or mediator. He follows Hannah Arendt and affirms the role 
of judgment in this regard, as being both partly doxastic and partly oriented to episteme. 
There are some questions about this solution, this recourse to the “common sense use of 
our faculty of judgment” (459). Is this phenomenology as urdoxa, or higher doxa, as 
Deleuze says, while his own philosophy counsels us to be done with judgment? Perhaps 
there is a less problematic middle way to take, that is via the body, and an operative 
intentionality that precedes explicit opinions, beliefs, and the like and is basic to our 
perceptual faith, as paradoxical and teething as it is. In this respect I cannot help but 
wonder whether some of Merleau-Ponty’s political writings in Humanism and Terror and 
Adventures of the Dialectic may have more to offer on these questions than this revisiting 
of Arendt, but such a suspicion cannot be justified here.  
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 Time and History. Time has been fundamental to phenomenology since Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and it was central to Husserl’s early work too, perhaps most 
notably in his account of the phenomenology of internal time consciousness which was 
subsequently adjusted and refashioned by Heidegger. The essays by David Carr, Gunter 
Figal, and Nicholas de Warren in this part of the book do justice to this rich heritage.  
 
 Carr’s “Experience and History” reflects on the manner in which we have an 
experience of history that is not reducible to representation and memory. Nicholas de 
Warren’s essay, “The Forgiveness of Time and Consciousness”, is likewise impressive, 
revolving around the mutual dependence of forgiveness and time: forgiveness requires 
time and time sustains forgiveness (503), even if forgiving and forgetting are not the 
same thing. 
 
 I have touched on just a selection of the 28 essays in this Handbook. There are 
also impressive essays by David Cerbone, Charles Siewert, Renaud Barbaras, Ed Casey, 
Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, and Anthony Steinbock, to mention just a few of the 
prominent phenomenologists in the collection whose work I have not addressed. 
Certainly the volume as a whole is ample evidence that phenomenology perdures, being 
on a philosophical and methodological trajectory that has seen out the 20th century and is 
alive and kicking in the 21st, something that cannot be said for many of its ostensible 
philosophical competitors during the twentieth century. That perdurance might be equally 
taken to suggest that it is genuinely contemporary, as the title of this book interestingly 
proclaims; or that it is in some sense universal and timeless (philosophy, properly 
understood, always already was phenomenology); or even that it is passé but preserved 
institutionally in contemporary academia. Whatever one’s assessment concerning this, 
what really matters is what those who inherit the name phenomenology do with it in the 
future. While only time will tell in that respect, this Handbook justifies some optimism 
about both what the future holds for phenomenology, and what phenomenology promises 
to contribute to the future of philosophy. 
 
Jack Reynolds 
La Trobe University 
